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IN THE

SUPREME COURT
OF THE STArrE OF UTAH

ROY D. THATCHER, LEROY B. YOUNG
and P A"GL THATCHER, co-partners, doing
business under the firm name and style of
THATCHER & YOUNG,
Plaintiffs,

vs.
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF THE
STATE OF UTAH, and BERNICE Y.
ROSENBAUl\I, for herself as a widow, and
also as the mother of JOAN B. ROSENBAUM and ELYNOR K. ROSENBAUM, the
minor daughters of :MORRIS DEWAYNE
ROSENBAUl\tf, deceased,
Defendants.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
The plaintiffs are and at all times herein mentioned
were attorneys at law duly licensed by this court to
practice their profession throughout the State of Utah.
In February, 1946 one Morris Dewayne Rosenbaum
died of injuries resulting from an accident occuring in
the course of his employment by one H. ll,ay Sholty.
Shortly thereafter his widow filed with the Industrial
Commission an application in her own behalf and in that
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of her minor daughters, claiming workmen's compensation as provided by law. At that time the widow
was advised by a member of the Industrial Commission
that it would not be necessary for her to retain counsel
to represent her at the hearing upon her application,
but that the Commission would give her a fair hearing
and make such order as she was entitled to without the
expense of counsel. However, upon the hearing, the
Industrial Commission found that the decedent was
not the employee of Sholty, and entered an order
denying any compensation.
The widow thereupon consulted with the plaintiffs
herein. At that time she had no money to pay them a
fee. It was recognized that to obtain a reversal of the
Industrial Commission's order in view of the record
made at the hearing and the presumptions in favor
of the correctness of the Commission's order would be
a very difficult legal task requiring a high degree of
legal skill, and that any fee to be paid plaintiffs for
their services would have to be contingent upon the
successful performance of this task. Accordingly the
widow retained the plaintiffs as her attorneys to obtain a review of the decision of the Commission upon
a reasonable fee to be agreed upon and paid them only
in the event that plaintiffs' efforts in behalf of the
claimants should result in the making of an award of
workmen's compensation to the widow and children of
the decedent.
The plaintiffs, as attorneys for the dependants of
the decedent, filed before the Industrial Commission
their application for rehearing, which was denied.
Plaintiffs then briefed very carefully all the questions
2
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involved and procured the issuance in due course of
a writ of certiorari to the Industrial Commission for
the review of its order denying compensation, and after
further careful briefing· wrote and submitted their brief,
read the brief of the respondents and the authorities
cited therein, and argued the case before the Supreme
Court in Salt Lake City. The Supreme Court, in a
divided opinion, set aside the order of the Industrial
Co!Illllission denying compensation. Rosenbaum v. Industrial Com mission, Utah, 185 Pac. 2d 511. Thereupon
the respondents in that case filed a brief arguing that
the matter should be reheard, but failed to file any
petition for rehearing.
After briefing the question involved in the respondents' failure to file a petition with their brief, the
plaintiffs herein, as counsel for the widow, filed a
motion for the issuance of a remittitur. Thereupon
the respondents in that case filed a motion to be relieved
of their default and sought leave to file the petition for
rehearing. Both motions were argued before the· court
in chambers and submitted, and the motion of the
widow was denied and the motion of the respondents
therein was granted and an order made allowing them
to file their petition for rehearing. The brief on the
application for rehearing was then read and studied by
the plaintiffs and a reply brief prepared and filed. The
petition for rehearing was denied by the court. The
various proceedings are outlined in some detail in the
petition for the .writ in this case.
Thereafter the plaintiffs and their client discussed
the matter of a fee and it was agreed between them that
One Thousand Dollars ($1,000.00) was a reasonable con3
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tigent fee to be paid them for their successful services
and plaintiffs' client agreed to pay that fee. This
agreement was reported by letter to the Industrial
Commission upon the request of the chairman. In the
meantime the remittitur had issued from the Supreme
. Court, and based upon the Court's ruling and the facts
in the case, the Commission vacated its previous order
denying compensation and entered an order awarding
to the dependents of the decedent compensation totaling
Seven Thousand Two Hundred Fifty Dollars ($7,250.00).
At the same time the Commission entered an order
fixing the fees of plaintiffs for their services to their
clients at Three Hundred Seventy Five Dollars (375.00)
and directing that that sum be paid to them directly out
of the compensation awarded. (R. 75.)
No notice was given to plaintiffs that their contract
with their client was to be set aside and the fee reduced,
and no opportunity was given them to be heard upon
the issues involved in such order or to present evidence
in support of their contract, nor did the Commission
hear any competent evidence regarding such fee as a
basis for its order in respect thereto. All these things
appear from the record certified to this court.
Thereupon the plaintiffs herein filed with the Industrial Commission their application for a rehearing
and the application was denied, and the application for
the writ of review herein followed in due course.
The plaintiffs' client still remains ready, willing
and anxious to pay to plaintiffs the One Thousand
Dollar ($1,000.00) fee agreed upon.
4
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In thi8 connection and before proceeding further,
we desire to advise the court that at the time the application for a rehearing was filed herein and again at the
time the 'Writ was issued by this court, the plaintiffs
advised their client Mrs. Rosenbaum that insofar as the
matter of the fee was concerned, she was an adverse
party to the plaintiffs herein and that we could not
advise her but that she was entitled to and should seek
other counsel and that she was perfectly free to oppose
any attempt to set aside or reYise the order of the Commission respecting the fees of the plaintiffs for legal
services rendered to her. She, however, felt that she
had made a reasonable bargain and she wanted to perform it, and joined in the application to the Industrial
Commission for a rehearing. We have not been advised
whether she has in fact consulted other counsel since
the writ was issued in this case.
STATEMENT OF ERRORS
The plaintiffs assign and rely upon the following
errors committed by the Industrial Commission for a
reversal of the order of the Commission fixing plaintiffs'
fees for legal services rendered their client at Three
Hundred Seventy Five Dollars (375.00):
1. The Industrial Commission erred and acted in
excess of its jurisdiction in entering its order of January
29, 1948 fixing the attorneys' fees of plaintiffs herein.
2. The Industrial Commission erred and acted
arbitrarily and capriciously and in excess of its jurisdiction in fixing the attorneys' fees of plaintiffs herein
at a sum less than the amount plaintiffs' client had
agreed to pay without first giving plaintiffs notice, and
5
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an opportunity to be heard and to present evidence upon
issues fairly drawn, and without hearing or taking any
evidence upon which to base its order fixing such fees.
3. The Industrial Commission erred and acted
arbitrarily and capriciously in fixing plaintiffs' fees at
Three Hundred Seventy Five Dollars ($375.00) and in
failing to approve plaintiffs' contract for fees to be paid
in the sum of One Thousand Dollars (1,000.00);
4. The Industrial Commission erred and acted
arbitrarily and capriciously in denying plaintiffs' application for rehearing of the matter of the Commission's
order respecting attorneys' fees.
ARGUMENT
Our first three assignments of error address themselves, in order, to the following three propositions:
Section 42-1-81 U.C.A., 1943, purporting to
authorize the Commission to regulate and fix attorneys'
fees is unconstitutional and void as an unwarranted
legislative and executive interference with the judicial
branch of the government in violation of Article V,
Section 1 of the Constitution of U tab.
1.

2. Said Section and the orders of the Commission
thereunder are also unconstitutional and void because
the statute authorizes the Commission to regulate and
fix, and the Commission has in fact reduced and fixed
the fees of attorneys, and particularly the plaintiffs, for
their services without notice or opportunity to be heard
or to present evidence in an orderly proceeding, thus
depriving plaintiffs of property without due process of
law and denying equal pdotection of the law in violation
6
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of Section 1, Amendment XIV of the Constitution of the
United States and Anicle I, Section 7 of the Constitution
of Utah.
3. EYen if the statute is valid, still the Commission,
under the facts, acted so arbitrarily, capriciously and
unreasonably in refusing to approve the agreed fee of
$1,000, and in fixing such fees at the unreasonably low
sum of $375 that it has abused its discretion, and this
court will correct that abuse.
Our fourth assignment of course embraces the first ·
three, for if the commission erred in any one of the three
points first assigned, it erred in failing to gTant a rehearing to correct those errors. These matters will be
discussed in order.
Point 1. The Commission is without jurisdicUon
to fix plaintiffs' fees beca1tse the statute purporting to
grant that jurisdiction is a void attempt of the legislature to authorize an executive commission to invade
the judicial prerogative by regulating the conduct of
attorneys as officers of the court.
So far as we have been able to ascertain this is the
first time this question has been raised here or in any
other state having a statute similar to our section 421-81, U.C.A., 1943. Apparently no constitutional question
was submitted to or considered by this court in Ellis
vs. Industrial Commission, 91 Utah 432, 64 Pac. 2d 363
or In re Hatch, 108 Utah 446, 160 Pac. 2d 961, the two
previous cases in which the statute bas been involved.
Article V, Section 1 of the Constitution of Utah
provides that
7
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''The powers of the government of the State
of Utah shall be divided into three distinct departments, the Legislative, the Executive, and the
Judicial; and no person charged with the exercise
of powers properly belonging to one of these
departments, shall exercise any functions appertaining to either of the others, except in the cases
herein expressly directed or permitted.''
The Industrial Commission, of course, is a creature
of the legislature, an executive or administrative body
without power to perform judicial acts or to exercise
· judicial functions.
Logan City vs. Industrial Commission,
85 U. 131, 38 Pac. 2d 769
Attorneys, including the plaintiffs herein, are officers of the court-of the judicial branch of the government of U tab.
This Court, in the case of
Ruckenbrod vs. Mullins,
102 Utah 548, 133 Pac. 2d 325,
144 A.L.R. 839,
in its most illuminating opinion, reviewed the history
of the development of the judiciary as an independent
branch of government and of the role of the attorney
in the judicial system. As the Court there says '' Today
our judicial procedure is such that the attorney is
indispensable.'' The right to counsel in litigation is
granted by Article I, Section 11, of our State Constitution. Only the most general knowledge of our established procedure is necessary to arrive at the inescapable conclusion that the office of the attorney plays
an integral and absolutely essential, an "indispensable"
8
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role in the administration of justice by the udiciary
of Utah. Without the attorney the wheels of justice
would become clogged and would grind to a stop.
It follows that any action which militates against

the free and effective functioning of the attorney in the
discharge of the duties of his office strikes at the roots
of the judicial system itself. For this reason if for no
other, it is the general rule that the admission of attorneys to the bar, the regulation of their professional conduct, and their discipline and disbarment are judicial
functions and powers which are inherent in the Court.
As this Court said in Ruckenbrod v. Mullins, supra, ''To
properly function it is necessary that courts retain
control of their officers.''
As the Court recognized in its opinion in the Ruckenbrod case, the legislature may make reasonable regulations in aid of the power of the courts to control their
attorney-officers but the ultimate power must be and
is inherently in the courts. This rule has. the widest
acceptance. Its application is well stated by the Annotator in an extensive note dealing with admissions to
the bar (144 A.L.R. 150) as. follows:
"Under most constitutions the sounder and better
supported doctrine seems to be· that, in the exercise of its police power, in the interest and for the
protection of the general public, a legislature may,
with entire validity, reasonably regulate admissions to the bar, but that any statutory provision
which, as put into effect, involves interference
with, or frustration of the courts in the performaliCe of their duties and ftmctions cannot be regarded as valid." (Italics added)
9
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

That is the effect of the rule announced by this court
for this state in the case of
In re Platz
42 Utah 439, 132 Pac. 390, 392,
which was quoted with approval in the Ruckenbrod case.
See also
In re Unification of :Montana Bar Association,
87 Pac. 2d 172.
An excellent headnote by Carter, J.,
Nebraska Supreme Court, in the case

of the

In re Integration of Nebraska State
Bar Association,
133 Neb. 283, 275 N.W. 265, 114 A.L.R. 151,
reads
"The Supeme Court has the inherent power to
regulate the conduct and qualifications of attorneys as officers of the court. The proper administration of justice is the main business of a court,
and whatever obstructs or embarrasses its chief
function must naturally be under its control. The
practice of law is so intimately connected and
bound up with the exercise of judicial power in
the administration of justice that the right to
define and regulate its practice naturally and
logically belongs to the judicial department of
our state government.''
In a very well considered case the Nebraska Court
has also held that, in absence of express grant by the
Constitution to the legislature, the power to regulate
the practice of law is vested in the eourts, and that
consequently a statute providing that any Nebraska

10
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law school should be deemed "approved" so that its
graduates are entitled to take the bar examination is
unconstitutional and void as an unwarranted encroachment upon the judicial prerogative. See
State ex rei. Ralston v. Turner
4 N.W. 2d 302, 1-l:-! A. L. R. 138

See also the case of
In re Fletcher
107 F. ~d 666, 668, cert. den. 309 U.S. 664,
in which the lTnited States Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia says
"It is held by the great weight of authority that
it is within the inherent power of courts of general jurisdiction to define and regulate the practice of law and that this power includes the ·
control of practice not only in the court, but also
outside. See Opinion of the Justices, 1935, 289
l.Iass. 607, 194 N.E. 313; Judd v. City Trust &
Savings Bank, 1937, 133 Ohio St. 81, 12 N.E. 2d
288; Rhode Island Bar Association v. Automobile
Service Association, 1935, 55 R. I. 122, 179 A. 139,
100 A. L. R. 226; In re l\1:orse, 1924, 98 Vt. 85, 126
A. 550, 36 A.L.R. 527. ''
In this case a disbarred attorney was held guilty
of contempt for sending a letter representing that he
was authorized to practice law.
The Supreme Court of Louisiana has considered
these principles in its very well reasoned opinion in the
case of
!\[eunier v. Bernich
170 So. 567.
11
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That was an action by a "claim adjuster" upon a
written contract solicited by the plaintiff' whereby he
ep.gage<l to investigate, adjust and collect defendant's
claim for the negligent death of their child for one-third
of the proceeds, under a statute specifically authorizing
a lay person to perform such services provided he does
so without resort to court proceedings. It was held
that such services constitute unauthorized practice of
law, that regulation of the practice of law is an exclusively judicial function, and that the statute was unconstitutional as an impingement on the exclusive prerogative of the judicial branch under the section. of
the Constitution dividing the government into three
branches. The contract for employment was therefore
illegal and void. The Court's reasoning is so well stated
we feel constrained to quote at some length from the
opnnon.
The Court says :
"Due to the fact that courts are not impowered
to enact laws, the jurisprudence has approved
legislation passed in aid of the courts' inherent
powers. But, while such statutes, in aid of the
courts' powers will be sanctioned, by the same
token, the courts disapprove and render valueless
any legislation, which has the effect of divesting
or stripping its inherent powers ...
''It is therefore manifest that the Supreme Court
not only possesses the inherent power to prescribe
the ultimate qualifications for those who wish to
engage in the practice of law, but this prerogative
necessarily includes the regulation of the law
practice. The legislature may aid, by the passage
of statutes, the exertion of judicial power subject to the approval of the court. And, albeit,

12
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while the Leg-islature may enact laws to aid the
courts in the protection of its inherent power,
the courts will suppress and disapprove statues,
such ns the exception contained in section 2, ...
which frustrate and stultify that implied judicial
authority ...
•'lJ nuer the Constitution, the Supreme Court is
giYen express power to regulate the conduct of
the members of the bar. When the legislature
passes a statute which attempts to define the
practice of law, it directly impinges upon the
constitutional grant of power bestowed upon
the courts respecting the regulation of the conduct of the members of the legal profession.

"If a lawyer solicits business, as Meunier has
done in this case, he can be brought before the
Supreme Court and tried for his misconduct in
office. .Meunier, however, acting in his capacity
as an adjuster, ... is, by authority of the exception, privileged to do all things that a qualified
lawyer might do in the practice of law, save
appearance in Court, without being subject t9
the discipline of or regulation by the court and
wholly unrestrained by any consideration of the
ethical standards of the profession. This type
of statute has the effect of nullifying the power
vested in the Supreme Court to punish those
persons, who engage in the practice of law without a license ...
"It is a matter of common knowledge that attorneys customarily handling damage suits do so on
a contingent fee basis. The fee of the attorney
iH fixed on a percentage of the amount recovered
in court and in almost all cases, the percentage
of the attorne~v's interest in the outcome of the
litigation is higher than that received by him in

13
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other· case.s because he is not compensated for his
services in the .event he fails to obtain a
judgment.''
''T.he rendering of legal services before an administrative tribunal, such as the Industrial Commission, is
the practice of law, and the power of the courts to dis:cipline and control attorneys extends to the field of such
practice. Neither the legislature nor the administrative
body which. it. has created has any power to authorize
. persons not- duly-licensed. by the courts as attorneys at
:law to =.engage in such practice.
People .ex_rel. Chicago Bar Ass'n
v. Goodman (Ill., 1937)
-B'N.E. 2d 941, 111 A.L.R. 1.
. It would. seem obvious that if attorneys are officers
. -of the judicial branch of the government, and absolutely
essential to the discharge of the functions of that branch,
:and· subject to ··regulation and ·control-by the courts in
·the performance of their official duties, they must be
:free-from hampering and fustrating control by the other
branches of government. If they. are. not, the effective
.function of the courts becomes subject to the arbitrary
whim of. the legislature or the executive. This becomes
apparent if·. we assume an extreme case. Suppose the
legislature· were to enact a statute forbidding any attorney to charge more than $10.00 for services before any
·court in. any •. one case. Although attorneys are public
-officers serving· in' the judicial branch of government,
they· are ·not· paid any compensation out of the public
'furids. (See :the.Ruckenbrod case, supra!) Neither does
the l~gislatur~ proVide for them office space or pay other
.expenses incident to their office. Attorneys are entirely
dependent upon the fees paid them by their clients for
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legal services rendered. If they are forbidden to receive
fair and adequate fee8 for legal services rendered they
can neither maintain themselves (Attorneys, also, eat.)
nor perform their functions before the courts. Moreover, some attorneys, as other human beings, if prevented from receiving· a fair return for their services?
thus being subjected to economic stress, will be
tempted ahYays to amplify their incomes through improper procedures, bringing the entire administration of justice into disrepute and materially impairing
the prestige and effectiveness of the courts. An apt illustration may be found in the Utah Bar's unfortunate
experience.
In re Hatch,
108 Utah 446, 160 Pac. 2d 961.
Furthermore, as the earning capacity of, and public
respect for attorneys is lowered, the bar attracts fewer
and fewer men of ability and energy, and the functioning
of the judicial branch of government is further hindered
and impaired.
And if, as here, a reasonable return for services
is prevented only in one field of legal practice, that field
tends to be neglected by capable and conscientious attorneys, until as a general rule, only the relatively incompetent practitioner, or the practitioner who refuses "to
deliver more than he is paid for'' will accept employment
in that field. Some very capable young men, newly
called to the bar, will occasionally practice in that field
during their ''starvation period,'' but ordinarily they
withdraw as soon as they are able.
Such is the case with workmen's compensation in
Utah. We believe it is common knowledge that few of
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the leading firms in Utah will, except under unusual
conditions, accept employment from a claimant before
the Industrial Commission. Such practice hardly pays
its share of office overhead, not to mention a ''fair
wage.''
It seems clear that the legislature's enactment of
Section 42-1-81, U.C.A. 1943, and the arbitrary and
capricious application thereof by the administrative
Industrial Commission materially interferes with and
frustrates the courts in the administration of justice and
in the control and regulation of their officers pursuant
to their exclusive prerogative. It is unconstitutional
and void.
Further strong support for this proposition is found
Ill

Ruckenbrod vs. Mullins
102 Utah 548, 144 A.L.R. 839,
hereinbefore referred to. It was there held that "The
attorney, because of his position as an officer of the
court, can be compelled by the court [not the legislature
or the executive] to render gratuitous services in the
defense of indigents ... " (Italics added.) The right
to compensation for one's labor is a property right.
McGrew vs. Industrial Commission
96 Utah 203, 85 Pac. 2d 608.
Such a right, of course, cannot be taken away without
due process of law. The court, in the Ruckenbrod case,
points out that the justification for a court order requiring an attorney to defend an indigent without pay
lies in the privileges incident to the office, in considera-
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tion of which (in effeet) the attorney, upon being called
to the bar, ,·oluntarily submits himself to the jurisdiction of the rourt to nwke such an order. He assumes the
burdens \Yith the privileges of the office.
Although commenting that in many states attorneys
haYe saddled upon them most of the common law duties
and obligations while many of the common law privileges no longer exist, the court holds that attorneys
still enjoy as privileg·es the exclusive right to set the
judicial machinery in motion in behalf of another, the
sponsorship of the courts as a person worthy of confidence, the right (in some states) to be free of occupational
tax, the right to hold office during good behavior, and
freedom from control by the legislature in his official
capacity. This court there observed,
''This freedom from control by all except the
courts in ·which they are officers is deemed a
privilege. ''
We submit that the Ruckenbrod case is controlling
here. It is a direct holding that attorneys are exempt
from legislative control in their practice of the law.
They are. subject only to the plenary power of the
courts.
Any statute encroaching on that power and infringing the privilege is void.
It is true that courts have, as a matter of interdepartmeut::d comity, sometimes recognized, or adopted
and enforced reasonable statutory regulations where they
have been in aid of the court's power. This is perhaps
analogous to the well known rule that ceretain aspects
of interstate commerce are subject to state regulation
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until the Federal government has assumed its exclusive
prerogative in the regulated area. It is equally analogous to the equally well known rule that when Congress
has taken any action within the regulated field, all
previous state regulations immediately determine and
have no effect.
See
11 Am. J ur. '' Commerce'' Sections 22 to 24.
Thus the Supreme Court of Massachusetts, in the
very reeent case of
In re Berkwitz,
80 N.E. 2d 45
held that a statute relating to admission of attorneys
to the bar was void because it dealt with subject matter
regulated by court rule adopted under the court's exclusive power under the Constitution, even though the
statute had, previous to the adoption of the court rule,
been aecepted by the court as in aid of its jurisdiction.
That is the situation in Utah. Prior to the adoption
by this court of the Rules of Professional Conduct of
the Utah State Bar, the court, without conceding the
legislature any plenary right to regulate the conduct
of attorneys (See In re Platz, 42 Utah 439, 132 Pac.
390) nevertheless recognized legislative enactments in
that field which were in aid of the court's jurisdiction.
However, it is noteworthy that when the Court, on
March 1, 1937, adopted the Rules of Conduct, it deemed
it necessary to incorpora.te the existing sta.tutes irn the
Rules themselve.-; . .. This was done in Rule II. Evidently
the Court and the officers serving it recognized that
unless so preserved the statutes would cease to be
effective from the moment the Court assumed to exercise its authority by rule.
18
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It i~ also noteworthy that this Court, in adopting
the Rules of Professional Conduct, declared that it did
so '• under the inherent power of the Court to control
and supervise the conduct of members of the Utah
State Bar." \Ye think it is also fair to observe that
these Rules of Conduct are well loaded with burdens
which the attorney assumes, and which should be regarded as more than ample consideration for the privilege for which we here contend.

The Court, in adopting the statutory rules of conduct, did not adopt section 42-1-81, under which the
Industrial Commission claims jurisdiction. It is to be
doubted that the Court could constitutionally so delegate
its power to an administrative body, at least without
prescribing policies, standards and rules for its guidance, and a procedure according due process and the
right to review by the Court. See
16 C.J.S. p. 507, note 62, et seq.
Instead of delegating the supervision of its attorneys
in the matter of fees to the Industrial Commission, the
Court itself prescribed the principles to , govern . the
fixing of the fee (Rule III, Section 32, paragraph 12.)
and provided for the discipline of attorneys who should
violate the provisions of the rule.
Rules of Discipline of the Utah State Bar.
In so doing this Court pre-empted the field in which
it has inherent and, under the constitution, exclusive
power and jurisdiction. Any authority which the legislature and its creature, the Industrial Commission, may
have previously had under rules of inter-departmental
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comity thereupon immediately ceased and determined.
Attorneys' fees in compensation cases, at least since
then, have been the subject of open and free agreement
between the parties concerned.
This of course does not mean that claimants are at
the mercy of unscrupulous attorneys who may exact
unconscienable fees from them. It is, we believe, comcon knowledge that under the Rules of Discipline the
State Bar Commission and its committees, as the authorized agency of the Court, has in fact heard and determined all charges made before them of the charging
of unfair fees or of over reaching by attorneys. Moreover, in cases of obvious abuse the courts have and exercise summary power to compel their attorneys to refund
moneys exacted from their clients.
Re Long
287 N.Y. 449, 40 N.E. 2d 247, 141 A.L.R. 651
Shima v. Shima
139 Fed. 2d 533, 150 A.L.R. 1179
It is submitted that section 42-1-81, U.C.A., 1943,
as put into effect and administered by the Industrial
Commission interferes with and frustrates the courts
and their officers in the performance of their duties
and functions, is an unjustified and unwarranted encroachment on the judicial branch of government, and
is therefore unconstitutional and void. The order of
the Commission in this case of course falls with the
statute.
Point II. The statute in question, and the procedure
and order of the Commission thereunder are void for
violation of Section 1, Amendment XIV of the Const,i·
tution of the United States and Article 1, Section 7 of
the Constitution of Utah.
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At the outset it is perhaps well briefly to call the
court's attention to one phase of this aspect of the case
which is closely related to the matters discussed under
Point I. It i~ the rule that administrative proceedings
conducted under statutory authority do not constitute
due process of law unless the procedure and power of
decision committed to the administrative body is within
the power of the legislature to confer.
Dukich Ys. Blair
3 Fed. 2d 302.
This would seem to be elementary. As we have demonstrated in our previous discussion, the power attempted
to be exercised by the Commission in this case, as wielded
by it, encroaches upon the judicial prerogative, and is
not within the power of the legislature to bestow. Its
attempted exercise by the Commission therefore deprives plaintiffs, and attorneys generally, of their property without due process, and is unconstitutional and
void.
Again, even if it were to be conceded that the legislature under our system may regulate, or delegate the
regulation of the fees to be charged by attorneys for
their services as officers of the judicial branch (which
we do not), the legislature must still prescribe a policy,
standard or rule for the Commission's guildance, and
cannot vest it with an arbitrary or uncontrolled power
with regard thereto, thus permitting an encroachment
on the legislative prerogative.
16 C.J.S., p. 349, note 12,
and cases cited.
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Statutes purporting to confer such power are invalid
for the additional reason that they deny due process
of law.
Douglas vs. Noble,
261 u. s. 165.
Yet that is just what the legislature has attempted to
do here. It has said that "the Commission is vested
with full power to regulate and fix the fees of such
attorneys.'' No policy, no standard, no rule for guidance, or fixing reasonable limits, or even requiring the
Commission to investigate and fix its own standards
after reasonable notice and hearing. Nothing to suggest
even that either the client or the attorney are entitled
to notice and an opportunity to be heard before their
rights and duties are fixed by the Commission. ,Just
unlimited, arbitrary power, which this record shows the
Commission has exploited to the fullest extent. Clearly
this infringes the state and federal constitutions.
We think that the arbitrary application of this asserted power by the Commission also deprives attorenys
for claimants and their clients before the Commission of
the equal protection of the law, in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. In this
case and other cases the Commission has fixed the fees
of the attorneys for the claimant at notoriously low
figures. Neither here, nor in any other case, so far
as we know, has the Commission even attempted to fix
the fees of counsel for the private insurance carrier.
The latter is free to charge and collect a reasonable fee
under the principles set out in the Court's Rules of Conduct. This certainly is an unfair and unreasonable discrimination between the attorneys (who are surely in
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the same class) a11d "·e belieYe it is equally unfair and
unreasonable as bebYeen the parties. As we have
pointed out, as a practical matter it prevents the
claimant fron1 obtaining competent counsel of his own
choice. At the Yery least it drastically limits his choice,
and in many cases must result in the claimant relying
upon counsel of relatiYely inferior ability in the presentation of difficult facts and extremely nice points of
law. While we realize that we are not here entitled to
urge the discrimination against the claimant, it is still
proper to mention the rna tter so that the Court may
be cognizant of all of the background of the problem.
And we do submit that the action of the Commission
in this regard infringes the "equal protection" clause.
See 12 Am. Jur. "Consti. Law" section 566.
Even more serious, however, is the legislature's
failure to require, and the Commission's failure to accord to plaintiffs herein the notice and opportunity to
be heard before a competent tribunal in an orderly proceeding, which is the very essence of procedural ''due
process.''
12 Am. Jur. "Consti-Law," section 573, p. 267.

As the record shows, when plaintiffs reported their agreement as to fees at the request
of the Commission, the Commission, without notice to plaintiffs or their client, without granting
any opportunity to be heard, without tendering
any Issues, or taking any evidence, and without making any findings of fact, fixed plaintiffs
fees for their services before the Court at a mere 3j8 of
the reasonable fee upon which the parties concerned had
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agreed. Then, further to demonstrate the arbitrary
bias of the Commission, when this omission was called
to its attention in the petition for rehearing (R. 78), it
denied the petition and again refused to accord plaintiffs the essentials of due process.
The right to receive compensation is, as before observed, a property right.
McGrew vs. Industrial Commission,
supra.
It is obviously immaterial, from a legal viewpoint,
whether one is deprived of all or part of his propertywhether compensation is entirely denied or only reduced below an agreed fair return. A deprivation of
property within the meaning of the constitution is involved in either case, and cannot he legally accomplished
without compliance with the constitutional requirements.

This court has held that notice and an opportunity
to be heard are elementary requirements of due process
which cannot be refused in a proceeding before the Industrial Commission, and an order made without observance of those fundamental rights is void.
Denver & R.G.W.R. Co. vs. Industrial Commission
74 Utah 316, 279 Pac. 612.
The legislature specifically required (section 42-1-10, U.
C.A. 1943) that the rules of the Commission provide for
service of notice "in all claims for compensation," but
the requirement of notice before depriving an attorney
of a fair compensation is conspicuous only by its absence
from the act. Nor has the Commission attempted by
rule or practice to supply the deficiency, either because
of a settled policy to discourage the appearance of
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attorneys before it, or, perhaps, because it recognized
the futility of an ad1ninistrative attempt to supply a
legislative deficiency.
For where a statute does not provide for notice and
an opportunity to be heard it is unconstitutional and
void, and it is immaterial that the agency in charge of
its administration may in fact have accorded notice
and such opportunity to one affected.
People Ys. Broad ( Gen 'l. Motors Ace. Corp.,
Intervenor) 12 Pac. 2d 941. (California);
cert. den. People v. General :Motors Ace.
Corp., 287 U.S. 661.
There are a number of interesting cases in which
orders of Industrial Commissions fixing attorneys fees
have been vacated for failure to follow the requirements
of due process. In none of them has the enabling statute
been attacked, as here, but they are nevertheless very
instructive, and are exactly in point as regards the
procedure here followed by the Commission. In
Bentley vs. Industrial Ace. Commission,
171 Pac. 2d 532 (Calif D. Ct. of App., 1946),
certiorari was granted to review an order of the Commission fixing attorneys fees in a compensation case.
Because the attorney was not given a hearing the order
was vacated, \vith instructions to grant a hearing and
fix the fees on the basis of the evidence to be adduced.
The court sets out some of the factors for consideration
in fixing the fees and says :
"If an award of attorney's fees was not to be
based upon the facts which were known to the
referee and the Commission, the attorney should
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have been so advised, and should have been
allowed an opportunity to offer evidence as to
all matters property to be considered in fixing
his fee. His petition for rehearing should have
been granted. for that purpose.''
''We deem it important, however, that attorney's fees in such matters should not be fixed
with the sole purpose in view of saving the
applicant from expense. The basis upon which
fees are fixed should not be so low as to discourage competent attorneys from accepting employment in industrial accident matters. Schilling
vs Industrial Accident Commission, 47 Cal. .A.pp.
190, 190 p. 373. ''
From
Conrad vs. State Industria] Commission,
73 Pac. 2d 858 (Okl. 1937),
We wish to quote the 2nd and 5th syllabi prepared by
the court, and one short statement from the Court's
opinion:
'' 2. The claim for an attorney fee in a proceeding before the State Industrial Commission
must be submitted to and heard by the Commission upon due notice to the parties affected thereby pursuant to the requirements of due process of
law.''
'' 5. In considering a claim for attorney's fees
in a proceeding before it, the State Industrial
Commission should be guided by the evidence
concerning the services rendered and should approve such fee as may be just under all the circumstances and in consonance with right and
justice between both the workman and the
attorney.''
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ln its opinion the Court says:
· · '1'i1e rig~lt of au at toruey to be paid for his
sen·iees is a Yaluable one, and he cannot be made
to acl'ep t an ex parte a\ntnl made therefor . . .
On the contrary the claim for such services must
be ::;ubmitted to the Commission by the party
entitled thereto and if not so submitted it cannot
be heard by the Commission but when it has
been so submitted, then the Commission must hear
evidence in support thereof and in opposition
thereto, and the Commission should show the
attoruey the same cousid erat-ion it accords to the
in.jured 1vorkman . . . In the award now under

reYiew this was not done but the petitioner was
given neither an opportunity to be present nor
to offer any evidence in support of his claim,
but the action of the Commission was apparently
wholly ex parte. This constitutes a denial of
due process of law guaranteed by section 7,
Article 2, of the Constitution, and cannot be
countenanced by this Court ... " (Italics added.)
The companion cases of
W arrenberg vs Cline,
114 Pnc. 2d 302 (Colo. 1941), and
Cline vs W arrenberg,
126 Pac. 2d 1030,
are very helpful. Both cases were appeals from judgements iu a lmYer court in actions brought to review an
order of the Industrial Commission fixing the fees of
claimant's attorney in a compensation case. In the first
case the Colorado Court held that the Industrial Com-'
mission had acted arbitrarily in refusing the attorney
a hearing on the question of the amount of the fees to
be allowed the attorney for his services, and further,
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that the trial court, on reYiew, had no authority to fix
such fees in the absence of evidence and findings supporting its order. The case was remanded with instructions to refer the matter to the Commission to hold
hearings and to fix the fees in accordance with the
principles outlined by the court as the proper basis for
fees.
After holding hearings as directed the Commission
again fixed the fees of the Attorney, who again sought
review by the Court. This was the second case above
cited. The Court held that the legislative intent in the
enactment of the statute authorizing the Commission to
fix the fees of the attorney was to prevent attorneys
from exacting excessive or unreasonable fees (a duty
the Courts have assumed in Utah), and that the intent
was not "to place the amount to be allowed as attorney's
fees on such a low and unreasonable level as would
foreclose a claimant from obtaining the legal services
of competent counsel.'' The court continues, ''to arbitrarily deny a claimant the right of competent legal
representation, by fixing unreasonably low remuneration for services rendered by attorneys, is a serious
matter, and may amount to a denial of due process.
Preconceived ideas of the commissioners as to the
value of legal services rendered in workmen's compensation cases should not be permitted to override the
sworn testimony of competent witnesses as to the
value of those services in a given case.'' The court
found that the Commission's allowance was unreasonably low, expressed its opinion as to a proper fee, and
remanded the case for further proceedings consistent
with its opinion.
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And in the case of
Employers Liability Assurance Uorp.
v. Sims, '67 s.vv. 2d 445,
the Texas Court had before it a case involving the fixing
of attorney's fees in a workmen's compensation case.
Apparently no issues had been made on the fee question.
The court observes:
~ •It is elementary that, in any case, no judgement can be rendered, unless it be in response to
proper pleading·s by one seeking the judgement;
hence a proper pleading was necessary in respect
to the allowance of an attorney fee, to warrant
the court to fix a fee, and to enter judgement
therefor.''

It is interesting to note that there the Texas Court

allowed a fee of one-third of an award of $4,389.14.
Apparently in Texas the legal servant is deemed worthy
of his hire.
We submit that the order of the Commission in the
case at bar is void because it was entered without due
process and because it denies the plaintiffs the equal
protection of the law, and that the statute under which
the Comm_ission purported to act is unconstitutional and
void for denial of due process.
Point III.
Even if the Commission had author~ty
to fix plaintiffs fees, in rejecting plaintiffs' contract
for a fee of $1,000.00, and fixing a fee of only $375.00
it acted arb,i,trarily and capriciously, and abused its dis·
cretion, and the abuse will be corrected.
It is difficult to argue this point, as a full argument
would require full consideration of the facts, and the
arbitrary action of the commission in refusing a hearing
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has prevented the proper developmnet of the record to
disclose all the facts and circumstances which make the
fee allowed by the commission so unreasonably low.
Quite frankly, we hesitated to make the statement of
facts in this brief as full as we have, but on reflection
we concluded that the Commission's inclusion in the'
Record (pp. 67 to 73) of our letter of January 28, 1948,
outlining the facts, justified us in so doing even though
we beli~ve it is not competent evidence except as an
admission by us that no more than $1000.00 was due for
fees. Moreover, we think that inasmuch as this case
is in effect a continuation of the case of Rosenbaum v.
Industrial Commission, No. 7021, ................ Utah ................ ,'
185 Pac. 2d 511, in this court, the court may here take
judicial notice of the proceedings before this court which
form the basis for the agreement for a $1000.00 fee.
Moreover, the presiding officers of this court are
attorneys, and although perhaps somewhat cloistered
as regards active practice and the matter of fees during
the term of their judicial service they have and are entitled to have judicial opionions on the reasonableness
of legal fees, as they did in Ellis vs Industrial Commission, 91 Utah 432.
And see
In re Associated Towel & Linen Supply Co.
7 F. S. 699.
The members of this court of course have (perhaps because of the human failings of counsel who write briefs)
a very complete k.riowledge of the labor involved in
briefing cases as close and difficult as the Rosenbaum
case, supra, here involved. We submit they are entitled
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to haYe and to act upon an opinion as to the unreason·ableness of the fee fixed by the Commission in this case.
In considering- this point we are of course immediately confronted with the divided opinion in the
Ellis case. In this connection we must confess we think
that "Jir. Chief Justice Elias Hansen and 1\'Ir. Justice
Wolfe had the better of it in their dissenting opinions,
and that, at least on this point, the Ellis case should be
over-ruled.
However, there are some very material distinguishing factors in the case at bar which, we submit,
make the Ellis case inapplicable. We shall refer to them
only briefly.
First, the $300 fee allowed to stand in the Ellis case
was 7.9+ lf0 of the total compensation ( $3781.41) obtained throug·h counsel's efforts, while in the case at
bar the allowed fee is only 5.2-% of the $7,250.00 award
obtained thr~ugh counsel's. efforts. (The fig-ures. in
the Ellis case are based on Chief Justice Hansen's
statement : $12.12 a week .x 52 weeks x 6 years.)
The agreed fee of $1000.00 in this case is only
13.4- lf0 of the $7250.00 benefit obtained, while in the
Ellis case all members of the Court thought a fee of
at least $600.00, or nearly 16<J0 should have been allowed.
Thus, on a percentage basis, the Commission's allowed fee is a full third lower in our case than in the
Ellis case. The court of course knows that in the case
of contracts for contingent fees the uncertainty of any
remuneration is customarily the most heavily weig-hted
factor considered in arriving at a fair and reasonable
fee. That is only practical and just. As we have ob31
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served, attorneys must maintain their offices and eat
if they are to serve their clients and the courts. An
attorney must expect to lose half or more of his contingent fee cases. So, if clients with colorable claims
but no money for a retainer are to have acess to the
courts in accord with the constitutional guarantee, the
fees in contingent cases must be large enough to carry
the combined load of cases won and lost. So it is that
20% to 40lf'0 or even 50% is very generally regarded as
a fair and reasonable contingent fee, depending on the
amount involved, the estimate of the chance of recovery,
the estimated work involved, and other minor factors.
When plaintiffs accepted employment in the Rosenbaum case the chances definitely were not good. The
case already had been lost, with strong statutory presumptions in favor of the commission's stand. Plaintiffs did not know the facts, which had been inadequately
developed in the Record made without the assistance of
counsel for the claimant, but with the very able assistance of opposing counsel. It was a very long shot, as
the divided opinion of this court has since conclusively
demonstrated. In such a case it is obvious that the
highest skill and a great deal of work are, and in fact
were involved. A large sum was at stake. And yet, because of the widow's lot, and because the general policy
is in favor of relatively small fees in workmen's compensation cases (though why it should be less than in a
negligence case against an insured defendant for the
death of a breadwinner we can't see) the plaintiffs
agreed to accept only l3.4lf'0 of the benefit achieved,
and were "cut down" to 5.2%!

I

I
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:Moreover, as the result of the inflation (of which
the court will take judicial notice) which has had its
inception since the Ellis decision, the cost of living and
of maintaining a law-office has increased enormously.
A recent headline reported the estimate of the federal
government that liYing costs are up to 171% of the
1941 cost. Naturally fees for legal services have likewise increased. (We eYen recall that the Bar supported
a measure for the increase of judicial salaries upon
earnest representations from most reliable sources that
such increases were absolutely necessary and eminently
fair.) Law office earnings, although higher, are not
keeping pace, and the situation is becoming so had that
the Editorial Board of the American Bar Association
Journal is with reason concerned over the future quality
and independence of the Bar. See ''In Behalf of Young
Lawyers," 34 A.B.A.J. 588 (July, 1948). Now is not
the time to cut attorneys fees.
It may be that the work and time involved in the
Ellis case was greater than that spent in the Rosenbaum case. The court's opinion seems to lend credence
to such a claim, inasmuch as two appeals were involved.
But here the amount of the claim involved was nearly
twice that involved in the Ellis case and the work was
substantial. And there three attorneys would have
testified that 50lf0 was reasonable.

Surely 13.4% is most reasonable-and 5.2% is
most unreasonable, as a matter of law, in this case.
It is so low, in view of the matters within the judicial
knowledge of the court, that the court should brand
it as arbitrary and unreasonable, vacate the order of
the commission and permit plaintiffs and their clients
to ·carry out the agreement they have made.
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As to the fourth assignment of error, it is obvious
that if the Commission acted in excess of its jurisdiction, and pursuant to an unconstitutional statute, and
ac.ted arbitrarily, capriciously and unreasonably in fixing so low a fee, and in denying plaintiffs any hearing,
they erred in refusing to correct the order when asked
to do so on petition for rehearing.
It is therefore submitted that this court should
vacate the order of the Industrial Commission fixing
plaintiffs fees as being entirely outside the authority
and jurisdiction of the Commission, in view of the unconstitutionality of section 42-1-81, or, if the Court will
not do that, it should vacate the order because it was
entered without due process and is unreasonable, arbitrary and capricious, and should fix or suggest a reasonable fee in accordance with its plenary power over its
attorneys, and remand the case for proceedings in
accord with its judgment.
We do not want to close this brief without saying
that this proceeding for review of the Commission's
order was undertaken only as a public service, and at
the urging of many of our brothers at the bar who are
genuinely concerned that the meagerness of the fees
allowed by the Commission and its arbitrary and
capricious policy and procedure in respect thereto
hampers and frustrates the· administration of justice, to
the ultimate great damage of the public and of the institutions of democracy. We believe it will be obvious
to the court that even if this proceeding results in payment of the total amount of the agreed fee, it will not
be profitable in a monetary way, for the time and effort
involved in preparing and presenting our position on
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these novel questions during a very busy time far outweigh the possible financial gain. (This is not intended
to intimate that we would spurn an increased compensation.) \Ve are convinced however, that these questions are of considerable public moment in Utah, and we
are happy to serve in an effort to resolve them properly.
We only hope our efforts will prove helpful to the
court in its study and deliberations.
Respectfully submitted,
THATCHER & YOUNG
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